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Abstract
The international system is a complex adaptive system with emer-
gent properties and dynamics of self-organization and informa-
tion processing. As such, it is better understood with a multidis-
ciplinary approach that borrows methodologies from the field of 
complexity science and integrates them to the theoretical perspec-
tives offered by the field of international relations (IR). This study 
is set to formalize a complex systems theory approach to the study 
of international affairs and introduce a new taxonomy for IR with 
the two-pronged aim of improving interoperability between differ-
ent epistemological communities and outlining a formal grammar 
that set the basis for modeling international politics as a complex 
adaptive system.
Keywords: international politics, international relations theory, 
complex systems theory, taxonomy, adaptation, fitness, self-orga-
nization  
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Una nueva taxonomía para las relaciones 
internacionales: repensando el sistema 
internacional como un sistema adaptativo complejo
Resumen
El Sistema internacional es un sistema adaptativo complejo con 
propiedades emergentes y dinámica de auto organización y pro-
cesamiento de información. Como tal, es mejor comprender con 
una aproximación multidisciplinaria que extraiga metodologías 
del campo de la ciencia de la complejidad y las integre a las pers-
pectivas teóricas ofrecidas por el campo de las relaciones interna-
cionales (RI). Este estudio existe para formalizar un acercamiento 
teórico de sistemas complejos para el estudio de los asuntos in-
ternacionales y presentar una nueva taxonomía para las RI con el 
objetivo bipartito de mejorar la interoperabilidad entre diferentes 
comunidades epistemológicas y esquematizar una gramática for-
mal que ponga las bases para los modelos de las políticas interna-
cionales como un sistema adaptativo complejo.
Palabras clave: política internacional, teoría de relaciones inter-
nacionales, teoría de sistemas complejos, taxonomía, adaptación, 
aptitud, autoorganización        
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Introduction
This study puts forward the idea that the international political system is a complex adaptive sys-
tem, with emergent properties and dy-
namics of self-organization. Hence, it 
suggests that the international system 
is better understood with a multidisci-
plinary approach that borrows meth-
odologies from the field of complexity 
science and integrates them with the 
theoretical perspectives offered by the 
field of international relations (IR). The 
overall scope of this study is to formal-
ize a complex systems theory approach 
to IR, define a new taxonomy for the 
discipline to improve interoperability 
between different epistemological com-
munities, and set the basis for future 
modeling of the international system as 
a complex adaptive system (CAS).
IR scholars have embraced the-
oretical diversity over the past decade 
and acknowledged the validity of a 
wide range of different theoretical per-
spectives in the realm of foreign poli-
cy. Many have welcomed theoretical 
pluralism as a positive development 
for the discipline. Dunne, Hansen, and 
Wight (2013, p. 416) argued that if we 
could use the vast array of positivist and 
post-positivist theories in a coherent 
and integrative way, we would be finally 
able to make sense of the multifaceted 
inquiries of international politics. But 
in reality, coherence is hard to achieve 
when confronted with an overarching 
and disorganized menu of theories and 
claims. And without coherence and 
method, the whole discipline becomes 
prone to relativism and loss of critical 
standards (Dunne et al., 2013, p. 415), 
transforming academic dialogue in an 
empty debate of perspectives and mir-
rors.
A more fundamental problem 
that affects both general theories and 
pluralist approaches of IR is a lack of 
understanding of the subdued nonlin-
earity of social, and therefore political, 
interactions among agents. For long, 
scholars thought they were looking at 
international politics, but instead, they 
were only looking at its linear, constant, 
continuous, and deterministic image. 
Theorists did not realize (at least most 
of them) that there was another image 
of world politics. That image is non-lin-
ear, discrete, stochastic, and composite: 
a chaotic face of the world where there 
are no general laws or causalities.
munities??????????????????????
?????????????????????
?????????????????????????
?????fitness, ???
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At large, IR scholars have de-
ceived themselves and only saw what 
they were already acquainted with. In 
the picture of social systems and inter-
national politics, they saw the image of 
linearity (Richards, 2000a, p. 3). Con-
sequentially, they blindly used positiv-
ist approaches to come up with general 
theories based on inductions and de-
ductions rooted in a simple and linear 
image of the world. However, the real 
world has never been linear and it has 
rarely fitted within the general laws and 
causalities found by social scientists. 
Repeatedly, new trends and unexpect-
ed events have confuted IR theories and 
required us to seek for new correlations. 
Eventually, the discrepancy between 
the real and the theoretical became so 
vast that IR theorist started to look for 
new epistemologies beyond positivism 
during the eighties. 
Unfortunately, the pursuit for 
a new epistemology in IR resulted in 
a twofold failure. First, it failed to re-
place empiricism, which far from being 
dead is even experiencing a resurgence 
in narrow scope quantitative research 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013). Second, it 
failed in finding a coherent epistemolo-
gy capable of dealing with the nonlinear 
ontology of social systems and interna-
tional politics. Scientific realism and 
critical theory were still fixated on the 
same linear world that positivist looked 
at. By assuming that the natural and the 
social worlds were governed by equal 
and objective recurrencies, scientif-
ic realism and critical theory recurred 
to a positivist epistemology to study 
international politics (Smith, Booth, 
& Zalewski, 2008, p. 35). Conversely, 
post-modern and post-structural the-
ories, like constructivism, ended up 
rejecting the image of an objective and 
“external world” to focus on the observ-
er or “subjective self ” (Smith et al., 2008, 
p. 30). Yet, by doing so, they focused on 
ontology and overlooked epistemology, 
leaving the task of the interpretation to 
the subjective, and biased, self (Smith et 
al., 2008, p. 18). 
Offering an alternative to general 
theories or pluralism, this paper sug-
gests that the complexity of politics can 
only be unraveled using an interdisci-
plinary research method that incorpo-
rates complex systems theory with IR: 
a method that allows for an ontological 
closure between the ‘real world’ and the 
world of our theories. The consequence 
of this closure is exciting as it implies 
that we can advance our knowledge of 
international politics by making more 
detailed and holistic analyses of the in-
ternational system that do not rely on 
oversimplifications for modeling. The 
methodology put forward by this study 
does not fixate on one specific level 
of analysis, but instead focuses on the 
multilevel nature of nonlinear dynam-
ics in the international system to find 
theoretical insights and explain the re-
lationships between agents and system 
behavior (Downey, 2012, p. 92). In-
stead of arbitrarily defining the agents 
of the international system and assum-
ing how they behave, it assumes what 
are the properties of agents (autono-
my, self-containment, and interdepen-
dence) and how behavior is generated 
(through the processes of performance 
system, credit assignment, and rule dis-
covery). 
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Over the last two decades, sever-
al attempts have been made to use com-
plex systems theory to analyze interna-
tional politics, see for instance Robert 
Axelrod’s The Complexity of Cooperation 
(1997), Neil E. Harrison’s Complexity in 
World Politics (2006a), Diana Richards’ 
Political Complexity (2000b), and Emil-
ian Kavalski’s “The Fifth Debate and the 
Emergence of Complex International 
Relations Theory” (2007). Yet, only a 
handful of IR scholars have advocated 
for the use of complexity theory as an 
overarching theoretical framework of 
IR, and fewer among them have used 
its modeling techniques to study the 
international system. This article hopes 
to fill a gap in the literature by posing 
the taxonomical foundations of a theo-
retical framework of IR rooted in com-
plexity theory. Overall, this study is set 
to offer a radical reinterpretation of the 
way we think of international affairs by 
proposing new ontological, epistemo-
logical, methodological, and taxonom-
ical perspectives. 
Where Does Complexity 
Theory Stand?
The fourth inter-disciplinary debate between positivist and post-positivist scholars has 
succeeded in moving out IR from a 
strictly positivist ground,1 but it has 
failed in creating cohesion over a new 
philosophical system. On theoretical 
pluralism, Dunne, Hansen and Wight 
wrote:
1 There has been a tendency among theory-leaden positivist scholars to shift toward post-positivism, 
this is the case for example of John Mearsheimer, which in a paper in 2013 wrote that scientific 
realism offers “a more convincing epistemology” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2013, p. 433).
Only pluralism can deal with a 
multi faceted and complex reali-
ty and only pluralism can deliv-
er substantial progress in terms 
of knowledge. Given the lack of 
agreed epistemological standards 
for assessing competing knowl-
edge claims, we should embrace 
all perspectives. [ ... ] Our view 
is that we should attempt to 
move towards a position we will 
term ‘integrative pluralism’. [ ... ] 
Integrative pluralism accepts and 
preserves the validity of a wide 
range of theoretical perspectives 
and embraces theoretical di-
versity as a means of providing 
more comprehensive and multi 
dimensional accounts of complex 
phenomena [emphasis added]. 
(Dunne et al., 2013, p. 417)
However, there is an inconsisten-
cy in this argument: a sum of not-good-
enough theories does not make for a 
good enough theory. Traditional IR 
theories are just not equipped with the 
necessary epistemology and method-
ology to make sense of complex adap-
tive systems. Pluralism, in this case, 
can only lead us to a plurality of errors 
and misinterpretations. Sure, the more 
theories we use, the more likely we are 
to find a tangential explanation for our 
phenomenon of interest, but none of 
those explanations will be able to grasp 
the core dynamics of the internation-
al system (adaptation, emergence, and 
self-organization). For this reason, we 
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should start using complex systems the-
ory also in IR. 
Moreover, complex systems the-
ory has the potential of reestablishing 
agreed-upon epistemological stan-
dards and promotes consilience in the 
field of IR. It does so as a non-positivist 
theoretical framework that integrates 
concepts and methods used by both 
positivist and post-positivist schol-
ars. Where positivist implemented an 
“outside view” of social sciences and 
post-positivist an “inside view” of it, 
complexity theory integrates the two 
views into an “inside-out” ontology that 
takes account of the nonlinear dynam-
ics that occurs between agents and sys-
tem in international politics (Harrison 
& Singer, 2006, p. 38).
Notwithstanding its potential, 
IR scholars have largely ignored or 
misused complexity science. Often, 
scholars have sloppily borrowed and 
decontextualized its taxonomy. This 
is, for instance, the case of Dunne et 
al. (2013), who, without ever men-
tioning complexity theory, defined 
the international system as a CAS.2 
Another scholar that misused com-
plexity theory is Alexander Wendt 
(1987, 2003), who decontextualized 
complexity theory as an analogy to 
2 Dunne et al. give a definition of the international system that seems taken from a complexity the-
ory textbook: “contemporary international political system is best understood as a complex open 
system, which displays ‘emergent properties’ and degrees of ‘organized complexity.’” Yet, they never 
mention complexity theory in their paper, and instead advocate that “integrative pluralism” is the 
most appropriate research framework to study complex systems (Dunne et al., 2013, p. 417).
3 Wendt develops his arguments using, and decontextualizing, a taxonomy drawn from complexity 
theory. For instance, he refers to emergence, self-organization, negative and positive feedbacks, 
upward causation, boundary conditions, etc (Wendt, 1987, p. 369; Wendt, 2003, p. 498). However, 
he does so without using the epistemological framework of complexity theory. Moreover, his stud-
ies do not use any form of computational modeling, which is a standard methodological practice 
to study CAS (Earnest & Rosenau, 2006, p. 145). For these reasons, Wendt’s interpretation of the 
international system as a CAS appears to be subjective and dogmatic. 
support his own arguments; even 
though his arguments were unsup-
ported from the epistemological and 
methodological standpoints of com-
plex system theory.3
It appears that Wendt and many 
other post-positivists in IR have, to 
some extent, grasped the nonlinearity 
of social systems. However, they missed 
to follow through the study of nonlin-
earity with the appropriate modeling 
methods and instead used hermeneutic 
and subjective analyses. This trend is 
pitiful because the computational tech-
niques offered by complex system the-
ory and agent-based modeling would 
have allowed them to make large-scale 
models of system dynamics generated 
bottom up using the “inside view” that 
they favor.
In sum, whereas positivist schol-
ars bluntly ignored nonlinearity in in-
ternational affairs, post-positivists ig-
nored the methodologies and analytical 
tools that could be used to study it. Con-
sequently, both scholarships “missed 
a lot” by not being able to observe or 
explain the emergent global dynamics 
resulting from nonlinear interactions 
of composite agents in the international 
system (Richards, 2000a, p. 2). As Di-
ana Richard (2000a) wrote:
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No wonder very few clear em-
pirical relationships have been 
found over decades of political 
science. If it is a nonlinear world 
and we are looking with “linear 
vision,” then we can only catch a 
small portion. Furthermore, our 
models of constant effects will 
miss something fundamental 
about what we are studying; as 
the saying goes, it’s like throwing 
a dead bird to model the flight of 
a live bird. (p. 2)
As this paper advocates, it is time 
for IR to stop missing out. Hence, the 
need for IR to embrace complex sys-
tems theory, pose much-needed onto-
logical and epistemological questions, 
and develop a new taxonomy that will 
improve interoperability between dif-
ferent epistemological communities 
and provide the basis for nonlinear 
modeling in IR.
IR is a discipline that tradition-
ally does not shy away from importing 
theories from other fields of studies.4 
Nevertheless, there has been only limit-
ed cross contamination with the field of 
complexity theory. Arguably, lack of di-
alogue and interdisciplinarity has large-
ly been caused by a linguistic cleavage 
among different epistemological com-
munities in the discipline. It appears 
that while all communities deal with 
the same field of study and use the same 
language, each of them has a different 
cognitive understanding of concepts, 
terms, and vocabulary. 
4 IR has borrowed political theory, philosophy, and history from the humanities; economics, soci-
ology, and law from other social sciences; and math, physics, and statistics from natural sciences 
(Dunne et al., 2013, p. 419).
Lack of cross-contamination 
among the communities is thus fostered 
by a lack of understanding among them. 
An effort of “translation” among taxon-
omies has been attempted in the book 
Complexity in World Politics: Concepts 
and Methods of a New Paradigm, edited 
by Neil E. Harrison (2006a). Where the 
first two chapters, written by Harrison 
and Singer, provide a seminal taxono-
my of complexity science for the use of 
social scientist. However, communica-
tion is not the sole impediment to the 
spread of complexity theory in IR. The 
discipline is also divided among meth-
odological communities. The divisions 
are furthermore aggravated by the fact 
that, as Richards (2000a) writes, meth-
odologists are known to “suffer change,” 
especially when they are too comfort-
able with their own methods (p. 3).
As it is today, the IR literature that 
has used complexity science is mainly 
found in the book series titled Princeton 
Studies in Complexity, and in two col-
lections of essays; the above-mentioned 
Complexity in World Politics, and Po-
litical Complexity: Nonlinear Models 
of Politics edited by Richards (2000b). 
Complexity in World Politics collects 
ten papers, including: An introductory 
article by Harrison and Singer (2006) 
that compares IR systems theory with 
complex systems theory. An essay on 
conflict resolution by Dennis Sandole 
(2006) that uses complexity to reconsid-
er “theories of identity-based conflict in 
the post-9/11 world.” A paper by Walter 
Clemens (2006) that uses complex sys-
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tems theory to explain why only a few 
(and fit) ex-Soviet states were able to 
integrate into the EU. An insightful es-
say by Matt Hoffmann (2006) that stud-
ies coevolution and adaptations in the 
context of the creation of international 
regimes. An agent-based model by Ravi 
Bhavnani (2006) on the spread of vio-
lence in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 
In addition, lastly, a chapter written by 
Robert Axelrod (2006), which ponders 
the role of simulation in IR and social 
sciences vis-à-vis traditional inductive 
and deductive methods.
The book Political Complexity 
is instead focused on political science 
and only few of its chapters touch upon 
international relations. Among those 
who do, are worth mentioning: Rich-
ards’ (2000a) paper on nonlinear mod-
eling, which reframes political science 
under a complexity theory framework, 
and her paper on nonlinear dynamics 
in games, which provides an example 
of modeling for international environ-
mental regimes. 
The Princeton Studies in Com-
plexity Series has published 14 full-
length books on complexity theory that 
ranges from biology to economics and 
political science. Those of particular in-
terest for the field of IR are: Axelrod’s 
(1997) book The Complexity of Coop-
eration, which uses agent-based mod-
eling and genetic algorithm to study 
cooperation and meta-norms. Lars-Er-
ik Cederman’s (1997) book Emergent 
Actors in World Politics, which reviews 
traditional IR scholarship and simulates 
state formation and “balance of power” 
in complex adaptive systems. And Josh-
ua M. Epstein’s (1996, 2007, and 2013) 
coauthored books, Generative Social 
Science, Agent Zero, and Growing Arti-
ficial Societies. Epstein’s trilogy provides 
a foundational framework for study-
ing social dynamics with agent-based 
modeling. The book Growing Artificial 
Societies uses complex systems theory 
in a holistic way to recreate in silico an 
entire society made of composite agents 
that, with a distributed artificial intelli-
gence, reproduce, create, consume and 
trade resources. The book is particu-
larly relevant because it provides case 
studies on how to “discover fundamen-
tal local or micro mechanisms that are 
sufficient to generate the macroscopic 
social structures and collective behav-
iors of interest” (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, 
pp. 12–16).
While there is a growing body 
of literature in social sciences that uses 
complexity science, the largest body 
is still found in natural and computa-
tional sciences (Henrickson & McK-
elvey, 2002). Fortunately, due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of complexity 
science, each theoretical advancement 
in a discipline quickly translates to an 
overall progress for all the others. For 
instance, the contribution of Stuart A. 
Kauffman’s (1993) seminal book titled 
The Origins of Order goes beyond the 
field of evolutionary biology and invests 
any scholar that uses complexity theo-
ry. A social scientist might as well find 
in Kauffman’s elegant use of modeling 
techniques a source of inspiration for 
modeling social dynamics. Similarly, 
John H. Holland’s (1995) book Hidden 
Order introduces computational tech-
niques that have been used in several 
fields of study and for different purpos-
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es, including the modeling of aggregate 
social behavior to the development of 
artificial intelligence. Among the most 
recent scholarship focused on the study 
of CASs are also worth mentioning 
Nino Boccara (2004), Claudius Gros 
(2011), and Allen B. Downey (2012), 
who have published very informative 
books focused on modeling techniques 
from mathematical and computation-
al perspectives. These books, together 
with Uri Wilensky and William Rand’s 
(2015) An Introduction to Agent-Based 
Modeling, provide a comprehensive 
overview and a good groundwork for 
any research project that tries to study 
the international system using complex 
systems theory.
Only a handful of scholars have 
advocated for the use of complexity the-
ory as an overarching theoretical frame-
work of IR, and fewer among them have 
used its modeling techniques to study 
the international system. Those who 
did, however, have succeeded in tack-
ling fundamental issues of international 
affairs, such as the creation of interna-
tional regimes, cooperative behavior 
and the emergence of nation-states (e.g. 
Axelrod, 1997; Cederman, 1997; Har-
rison, 2006a). Yet, while their findings 
have been widely acclaimed, their theo-
retical frameworks and methodologies 
have never gone mainstream among IR 
scholars. As advocated in this section, 
it is time for IR scholars to go beyond 
analogies on complexity and realize 
that the international system is a com-
plex adaptive system. Only then, under 
complexity theory’s epistemological 
5 As Seth Lloyd has catalogued, there are more than 40 different measures of complexity, among 
which: Shannon information, the degree of hierarchy, and schema length (Lloyd, n.d.).
warrant and methodologies, they will 
be able to study the international sys-
tem for what it really is: a system that 
lacks centralized control and that is 
composed of a large number of adaptive 
agents interacting in a nonlinear fash-
ion that gives rise to emergent behavior 
and principles of self-organization.
Concepts and Ideas for a New 
Methodological Approach to IR
Complexity science aims to de-velop cross-disciplinary insights into complex systems by using 
a methodology that is a combination 
of experimental, theoretical, and com-
puter simulation (Mitchell, 2015a). 
Complex systems, which can be either 
complex adaptive systems (CASs) or 
complex physical systems (CPS), are 
studied in several different disciplines, 
including evolutionary biology, immu-
nology, genetics, information science, 
dynamics, economics, and sociology. 
To define a complex system, it is 
better to put aside the concept of com-
plexity, and, as Holland (2013, Chap-
ter 1) and Boccara (2004, p. 4) suggest, 
focus on the properties of the system. 
Complexity comes in many different 
forms and shapes, and different disci-
plines tend to have different definitions 
and measurements of complexity.5 Nev-
ertheless, most complex systems share 
the same properties of nonlinearity, 
emergent behavior, self-organization, 
and information processing. Hence, 
a complex system can be defined as a 
“system composed of a large number of 
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interacting components, without cen-
tral control, whose emergent ‘global’ 
behaviour—described in terms of dy-
namics, information processing, and/
or adaptation—is more complex than 
can be explained or predicted from un-
derstanding the sum of the behavior 
of the individual components” (Santa 
Fe Institute, n.d.). Some of these prop-
erties, as lack of central authority, are 
self-explanatory, but others deserve to 
be briefly explained.
Nonlinearity in mathematics 
implies nonadditivity (Boccara, 2004, 
p. 56). A linear system is one that can 
be inferred “by understanding its parts 
individually and then putting them to-
gether,” but “a nonlinear system is one 
in which the whole is different from 
the sum of the parts” (Mitchell, 2009, 
pp. 22–23). Hence, nonlinear relation-
ships between agents in a system imply 
“that an independent variable does not 
have a constant effect on the dependent 
variable” (Richards, 2000a, pp. 1–2). 
Nonlinearity is also closely related to 
the concept of sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions and chaotic behavior.
The idea of sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions was first formalized 
by the mathematician Henri Poincaré 
at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Poincaré noticed that the initial config-
urations of a system play a determining 
role in setting the subsequent states of 
the system, and “when the sensitivity is 
high, slight changes to starting condi-
tions will lead to significantly different 
conditions in the future” (Santa Fe In-
stitute, n.d.). Systems with sensitivity to 
initial conditions often manifest chaotic 
behavior, which is a specific dynamic 
where systems change following trajec-
tories that appear to be random (Mitch-
ell, 2009, p. 32). As it has been proved, 
even a simple and deterministic equa-
tion as the logistic map, which is used 
to describe population growth in the 
presence of overcrowding, can lead to 
chaotic behavior even if its parameters 
are determined exactly. As it can be in-
ferred, sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions renders perfect prediction 
in modeling impossible in principle be-
cause variables cannot be measured “to 
infinitely many decimal places” (Mitch-
ell, 2009, p. 33).
Emergent behavior is as well re-
lated to the principle of nonlinearity. 
Emergent properties can be defined as 
“global-level attributes of a system that 
arise from the interactions of the com-
ponents of the system, and that are not 
explainable by the behavior of individ-
ual components of the system or the 
sum of the components acting as indi-
viduals” (Santa Fe Institute, n.d.). It is 
important to underline that emergent 
properties at the systemic level are an 
outcome of the nonlinear interaction of 
agents, and not of the agent’s properties 
(Boccara, 2004, p. 97). Hence, knowing 
the rules to which agents obey is not 
enough to predict the behavior of the 
system. The system is computationally 
irreducible, and, for this reason, CASs 
has neither reductionist explanations 
nor yield to compact forms of represen-
tations (Mitchell, 2015a).
Self-organization, as defined by 
Melanie Mitchell (2015b), is itself an 
emergent phenomenon, which can be 
described as the “production of orga-
nized patterns, resulting from localized 
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interactions within the components of 
the system, without any central con-
trol.” In other words, self-organization 
creates stable macroscopic patterns 
arising from the local interaction of 
agents with limited information and 
computational power (Epstein & Ax-
tell, 1996, p. 35). One generic pattern of 
self-organization is the one of “self-or-
ganized criticality,” which implies “that 
from any initial condition, the system 
tends to move toward a critical state, 
and stay there, without external con-
trol” (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1987, 
p. 381; Downey, 2012, p. 81). Self-orga-
nization, as it will be further explained 
later, requires the system to signal and 
process information.
If we want to define the interna-
tional system as a CAS, we can say that: 
the international system is composed 
of many diverse, interconnected, and 
interdependent agents that iterate non-
linear relationships from which mul-
tilevel behavior evolves and emerges. 
Because of non-linearity, lack of cen-
tral coordination, and the presence of 
lever points—the international system 
should not be studied with traditional 
positivist methodologies that assume 
linearity (Holland 2013, Chapter 3). 
Positivist theories are built inductively 
or deductively, with the previous dis-
covering patterns in empirical data, and 
the latter specifying a set of axioms and 
testing them (Harrison, 2006b, p. 139). 
6 “But unlike deduction, simulation does not prove theorems with generality. Instead, simulation 
generates data suitable for analysis by induction. Nevertheless, unlike typical induction, the sim-
ulated data come from a rigorously specified set of assumptions regarding an actual or proposed 
system of interest rather than direct measurements of the real world. Consequently, simulation 
differs from standard deduction and induction in both its implementation and its goals. Simulation 
permits increased understanding of systems through controlled computational experiments” (Ax-
elrod, 1997, p. 4).
Complexity theory follows a third way 
of doing science between induction and 
deduction.6 By relying on computation-
al simulation, it deductively sets axioms 
and generates data that can be studied 
inductively (Harrison, 2006b, p. 139). 
Since CASs are irreducible, scholars ul-
timately need the assistance of simula-
tion to be able to explain those (Earnest 
& Rosenau, 2006, p. 145).
To conclude, studying complexi-
ty does not require a paradigm shift in 
the way IR is studied. However, it does 
require some change in the criteria that 
scholars use to observe the world and 
build theories. When scholars model 
complexity, they need to shift from con-
tinuous to discrete, from linear to non-
linear, from deterministic to stochas-
tic, from abstract to detailed and from 
homogeneous to composite (Downey, 
2012, p. 4). In addition, also their pur-
poses in research have to change; stud-
ies should be explanatory and not nec-
essarily predictive, models should be 
instrumental and not realist, and the-
ories should be holistic rather than re-
ductionist (Downey, 2012, p. 4).
For a New Understanding 
of International Relations
A New Grammar and Taxonomy
Ontology and epistemology dictate 
what can be classified in a taxonomy, 
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and methodology helps to shape the 
semantics of the language spoken in a 
discipline. For this reason, positivism, 
constructivism, and complex systems 
theory held a different cognitive under-
standing of basic IR concepts. They use, 
in other words, different semantics and 
taxonomies.
The scope of this section is two-
pronged: defining a taxonomy of IR 
rooted in the propositions of complex 
systems theory to improve interopera-
bility between different epistemological 
communities, and outlining a formal 
grammar to set the basis for modeling 
the international system as a CAS. It 
is necessary to update IR’s taxonomy 
because the discipline has no standard 
language for analyzing the agent ac-
tions that construct the international 
system.7 Actions that are driven by con-
cepts, such as adaptation and coevolu-
tion, which are novel to IR and have yet 
to be systematically contextualized.
In addition, a well-defined tax-
onomy and grammar are also needed to 
standardize a language that is both ca-
pable of describing emergent phenom-
ena and at the same time following a 
syntax suitable for computational mod-
eling. As Holland (2013) suggests, a for-
mal grammar for studying CASs should 
be composed of “a set of generators (e.g. 
a vocabulary), and a set of operators for 
combining the generators into mean-
ingful strings (e.g. sentences)” (Chapter 
6). The purpose of the grammar is “to 
generate a corpus (set) that describes 
the states (sentences) that can occur 
7 As pointed out in the first section, this is true for positivism, but only partially true for post-modern 
theories of IR. As it was shown, some constructivists take into account the interactions between 
agents. Indeed, some of the concepts that they use resembles others of complexity theory. Neverthe-
less, the two epistemological communities still have different semantics (Holland, 2013, Chapter 1).
under the grammar’s rules” (Holland, 
2013, Chapter 6). Only with this formal 
grammar, Holland argues, it is possible 
to deconstruct and understand com-
plex adaptive systems.
Through deconstruction, a sys-
tem can be divided into Lego-like parts, 
also called building blocks, which serves 
as generators that can be put together 
to yield different emergent states of the 
system (Mitchell, 2009, p. 110). In the 
spirit of Descartes’ (1637) treatise Dis-
course on the Method, the aim of decon-
structing a system into building blocks 
is “to divide all the difficulties under 
examination into as many parts as pos-
sible, and as many as were required to 
solve them in the best way” (p. 17). In 
the study of CASs, the difficulties are the 
emergent properties, and the parts are 
the building blocks.
However, knowing what the 
parts of a system are is not enough to 
explain how a system behaves. The ag-
gregate properties of the international 
system, such as migration and war, are 
“not well-described by summing” or av-
eraging the acts and properties of sin-
gle individuals (Holland, 2013, Chapter 
6). This is because emergent behaviors 
do not arise from the proprieties of the 
building blocks, but instead from the 
iteration over time of adaptive interac-
tions between agents (Mitchell, 2009, p. 
6). Knowing the generators of a system 
is not enough to understand aggregate 
behavior. Instead, we need to know how 
the generators are combined together to 
yield emergent behaviors.
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In conclusion, decomposing a la 
Descartes is useful only if the decon-
struction is orderly and descriptive of 
the agent actions that construct the in-
ternational system. Hence, the purpose 
of a formal grammar is to conduct our 
thoughts, and modeling procedures, in 
a given order that is representative of 
the nonlinearity of the system,8 with the 
aims being logical clarity and interoper-
ability with the syntax of programming 
languages used for agent-based model-
ing (ABM).
The following sections serve to 
provide an overview of IR based on 
complex systems theory. The next three 
sections will individuate the generators 
of the international system, explain 
how these generators combine to yield 
together emergent behaviors, and infer 
what these emergent behaviors entail 
for the international system.
Generators: Agents and the 
Translevel Nature of International 
Relations
The concept of agent is instrumental 
and is used to identify the foundational 
building blocks of a CAS. Like any other 
building block, an agent is a generator 
whose properties and interactions give 
rise to aggregate behavior. Depending 
on the discipline, scholars tend to have 
different definitions of what an agent 
is; however, there are a few common 
properties that can be traced among the 
scholarships.
8 This argument differs drastically from the Descartes’s view, which claims that the purpose for de-
construction is “to conduct my thoughts in a given order, beginning with the simplest and most 
easily understood objects, and gradually ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of the 
most complex; and positing an order even on those which do not have a natural order of prece-
dence” (Descartes, 1637, p. 17).
The first property of an agent 
is autonomy (Macy & Willer, 2002, p. 
146). An agent, by definition, exists 
autonomously from the system. It pos-
sesses unique internal states and rules 
of behavior that allow him to operate 
autonomously with the environment 
and with other agents (Epstein & Ax-
tell, 1996, p. 5). The second proper-
ty is self-containment. An agent has to 
be bounded, identifiable, and discrete 
(Macal & North, 2009, p. 87). The third 
property is interdependence. Agents’ in-
ternal states and rules of behavior are 
continuously evolving and adapting 
through interaction with other agents 
and the environment. Interdependence 
is also tied to the concepts of adaptation, 
coevolution, and fitness. Beyond these 
general properties, there is also a wide-
spread consensus that agents should be 
adaptive, which means that they should 
change their internal stimulus-response 
rules based on a process of learning or 
evolution (Macy & Willer, 2002, p. 146).
Agents act, think, and process 
information autonomously based on 
their internal states and rules of behav-
ior. Internal states are the attributes of 
an agent. Humans, for example, have 
many attributes that define them, such 
as genes, physical properties, economic 
preferences, political identity, wealth, 
and skills (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, p. 
4). Rules of behavior are an assortment 
of simple stimulus-response rules that 
determine in which ways an “agent can 
change the state of the environment, 
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other agents, or itself ” (Wilensky & 
Rand, 2015, p. 209). We can think of 
each rule as characterized by a receptor 
IF and an executor THEN. To make an 
example, if there is an election, a citizen 
will use the detector “IF today is an elec-
tion day” to execute the effector “THEN 
go to vote.” The rule could also be more 
precise and use multiple detectors and 
effectors at the same time. Because of 
adaptive learning, agents do not always 
execute the same rule when faced with 
the same input; instead, they learn from 
their past and “change their behavior in 
the future to account for this learning” 
(Wilensky & Rand, 2015, p. 230).
To understand system-wide be- 
havior, it is essential to have a clear un-
derstanding of the granularity of the 
system, which is composed of agents, 
meta-agents, and sub-agents,9 with 
agents being the fundamental genera-
tors of the emergent behavior of inter-
est. Meta-agents can be quasi-bounded 
and possess certain degrees of autono-
my; however, their behavior can only 
be inferred as an outcome of agents’ 
actions and interactions (Harrison, 
2006a, p. 9). For example, the behavior 
of a nation-state in the international 
system cannot be inferred outside of 
the context that has generated it. Social 
organizations are neither self-contained 
nor autonomous. They are meta-agents 
generated by the primary agent of social 
systems: humans. In turn, agents are in-
terdependent , and their behavior can 
only be understood from a system-wide 
perspective that takes into account co-
evolutionary dynamics.
9 Agents are composed of sub-agents, and meta-agents are composed of agents. In agent-based mod-
eling, it is often said that “it’s agents all the way down” (Wilensky & Resnick, 1999, p. 1).
In other words, thinking in terms 
of adaptive agents requires us to consid-
er the international system as a complex 
whole. A whole that cannot be divided 
into levels of analyses, as IR scholars 
often like to do. As Wilensky and Res-
nick (1999) wrote, levels of analysis are 
used to provide three different kinds 
of views: organization-chart view, con-
tainer view, or emergent view. The first 
one is used to think of structural hierar-
chies within institutions, companies, or 
organizations. Levels, in this case, serve 
to conceptualize chains of command 
and organization-charts. The contain-
er view, widely used in IR scholar-
ship, “is based on the idea of parts and 
wholes” (Wilensky & Resnick, 1999, p. 
5). This view “differs from the organiza-
tion-chart view” because “the lower-lev-
el elements are parts of the higher-level 
elements” (Wilensky & Resnick, 1999, 
p. 5). For example, a month is part of a 
year (container view), but an employee 
is not part of the employer (organiza-
tion-chart view).
The third view is similar to the 
container view but focuses on “levels 
that arise from interactions of objects 
at lower levels” (Wilensky & Resnick, 
1999, p. 5). The difference between 
emergent and container view is subtle. 
After all, one might argue that just as a 
week is made of days, a state is made of 
people. However, the state–people rela-
tionship is significantly different. For a 
start, the composition of the state keeps 
changing; people leave, come, and die, 
so do companies, organizations, institu-
tions, and laws. Furthermore, the state 
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“arises from interactions among” the 
people, and it is not just a simple accu-
mulation of people (Wilensky & Res-
nick, 1999, p. 5). As Wilensky and Rand 
(1999) argued, “months do not interact 
to form a year; they simply accumulate 
or ‘add up.’ A year can be viewed, essen-
tially, as a long month” (p. 5). However, 
a state is not just a big person. The dif-
ference is qualitative (Wilensky & Res-
nick, 1999, p. 5).
IR theory has largely relied on 
a container view of the international 
systems. Usually, dividing the system 
into three arbitrary level of analysis: 
the individual level, the state level, and 
the international level. These levels, 
also called images, have been used by 
scholars to study the phenomena of in-
terest in isolation from the rest of the 
components of the system (Wilensky & 
Resnick, 1999, p. 5). However, by isolat-
ing a single phenomenon in a level of 
analysis, scholars lose the ability to see 
the emergent view and individuate the 
micromechanisms that are sufficient 
to generate the macroscopic behavior 
of interest (Vicsek, 2002, p. 131). This 
happens because these mechanisms are 
the outcome of cascading effects and 
chains of causalities that move from the 
micro to the macro, or vice versa, and 
therefore, can only be grasped through 
a multilevel perspective. Consequently, 
complex system theory breaks the dis-
tinction between the realm of domestic 
and international politics. International 
politics is the outcome of the interac-
tions of agents and meta-agents at the 
domestic and at the international level. 
Hence, it is not possible, as explained 
in the previous section, to understand 
the international system without con-
sidering how it has emerged from it the 
lower levels of interactions among the 
people. 
To conclude, by conceptualiz-
ing international relations in terms of 
levels of analysis as container views, 
IR scholars have repeatedly fallen into 
the trap of “slipping between levels to 
attribute properties of one level to an-
other” (Wilensky & Rand, 2015, p. 13). 
Idealists and realists slipped from the 
individual to the aggregate by giving 
human attributes to the state (e.g. states 
have national interests and are power 
seeking). Neorealist slipped from the 
aggregate to the individual by deriving 
the properties of states from the anar-
chic international system (e.g. states 
have to self-help and are security max-
imizers). Both cases are an example of 
the failure of integrative understanding, 
which bars to see states as meta-agents 
qualitatively different from the agents 
that compose them (people) and the 
environment that they inhabit (interna-
tional system).
Operators: Adaptation, the Higher 
Order Rule of International 
Relations
Adaptation occurs at the agent level 
through learning and at a systemic level 
through evolution. Overall adaptation 
goes in hand with coevolution. The in-
ternal attributes and rules of behavior 
of an adaptive agent constantly change 
through interaction with the environ-
ment and with other agents. As Hoff-
man explains: 
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When some agents change their 
behavior, this alters the system 
for the other agents. A new con-
text “forces” agents to alter their 
rule models as the context deter-
mines what goals, interests, and 
behaviors are appropriate or fit. 
Adaptive agents are always trying 
to “fit” with their context. When 
their internal rule models fit their 
context, the agents are successful. 
When their rules do not fit, the 
agents are not successful. System 
change results when innovation 
on the part of a subset of agents 
throws the system rules into flux 
and other agents then adapt their 
rule models and therefore their 
actions and interactions. [ ... ] 
The system rules, produced by 
agent actions and interactions, 
do more than constrain potential 
actions; they become incorporat-
ed, through the evaluation pro-
cess, into the agents’ rule models 
[emphasis added]. (Hoffmann, 
2006, p. 98)
As it can be inferred from this 
dense block quote, adaptation is a pro-
cess that shapes the behavior of agents, 
meta-agents, and systems. Using the 
grammar defined in this section, it can 
be said that whereas agents are the gen-
erators of the corpus, adaptation is the 
grammatical rule under which the gen-
erators combine to make a meaningful 
sentence. 
To understand how adaptation 
works, it is useful to borrow from com-
puter science and look at how adaptive 
agents are programmed in ABM and 
other computational models. Agents 
are adaptive if they can perform three 
procedures: performance system, credit 
assignment, and rule discovery (Hol-
land, 1995, p. 42). These procedures, 
which happen naturally and often un-
consciously in humans, are useful for 
the scope of this paper to describe how 
adaptation occurs at large.
The performance system proce-
dure has already been introduced in the 
previous section in the form of internal 
attributes and rules of behavior. To re-
cap, a performance system “specifies 
the agent’s capabilities at a fixed point 
in time” and what an agent “could do in 
the absence of any further adaptation” 
(Holland, 1995, p. 88). In the words of 
Hoffmann, the internal attributes and 
rules of behavior:
Represent the agent’s internal (or 
subjective) understanding of the 
world (the larger system) around 
them. They allow the agents to 
perceive and define their situa-
tion, predict the consequences of 
action, and act. In most applica-
tions of adaptive agents, the rules 
are behavioral, but they can also 
represent identities, interests, and 
goals. (Hoffmann, 2006, p. 98)
The second procedure, credit 
assignment, requires the introduction 
of the concept of fitness in order to be 
understood. Fitness is a concept that in 
mathematical genetics is used to repre-
sent the “ability of an organism to pro-
duce successful offspring” (Holland, 
1995, p. 65). In complex systems theory 
and computer science, fitness is instead 
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used to measure “the overall strength” 
of an internal rule of an agent (Hol-
land, 1995, p. 65). The underlying idea 
is that not all stimulus-response rules 
are equally effective in achieving agents’ 
goals or in guaranteeing their surviv-
al. To make an example, if we think in 
terms of survival of an agent, an “IF I 
see the cliff, THEN go straight” rule is 
less fit than one that has an effector that 
says, “THEN turn 180 degrees.” 
In order to understand which 
rules are fit, an adaptive agent assigns 
credit to each rule based on the payoff 
received after that the rule has been 
effected. However, if there is no direct 
reward after the execution of a rule, an 
agent is faced with a dilemma regarding 
credit assignment. If my rival increas-
es defense spending, should I also in-
crease mine in the eventuality of war? 
If the war never occurs, how do I mea-
sure the payoff of rearming vis-à-vis not 
rearming, or rearming just a little? This 
is what it is called a credit assignment 
problem. An agent has to be able to as-
sign credit to rules that (1) have no di-
rect payoff, and (2) are part of a chain of 
action that is not yet concluded.
In the first case, the problem can 
be addressed by using a mechanism 
that in mathematics is described by 
bucket brigade algorithms. This mecha-
nism serves to strengthen the credit of 
rules that belong to a chain of actions 
that ends with a good payoff (Holland, 
1995, p. 56). For instance, the rule that 
says “preemptively arm” would be re-
warded with a high payoff only if it is 
part of the chain of actions that has led 
to the overall survival of the agent. In 
the second case, since the chain of ac-
tions is not yet concluded, an agent has 
to be able to think and simulate the fu-
ture. As Holland suggests, he can do so 
by building internal models and discov-
ering new rules. 
Rule discovery creates new inter-
nal rules through a process that mimics 
evolution. This mechanism has well rep-
resented Holland’s genetic algorithms, 
which serve to combine and crossover 
rules of behavior to create plausible and 
fit new rules (Holland, 1995, p. 57). Like 
in chromosomal crossover, genetic algo-
rithms select couples of high credit rules 
and then cross them over with elements 
of randomness to create an offspring 
rule. In turn, the child rule is evaluated 
and, if considered strong, crossed over 
with another rule. Over time, the out-
come of this procedure fosters in the 
selection of new rules of behavior and 
strategies with high potential. 
Explaining in detail how to pro-
gram an adaptive agent is out of the 
scope of this paper. The reader will find 
in the bibliography useful sources that 
exhaustively explain how to program an 
ABM with properties of credit assign-
ment and rule discovery. For the scope 
of this study, what are of interest are the 
underlying rules of the process of adap-
tation, which if contextualized to IR can 
provide novel insights and new under-
standings. In particular, the concept of 
adaptation is fruitful to rethink agents’ 
behavior in international politics.
Regarding behavior, one com-
mon assumption of positivist IR theory 
is that humans, and therefore states, are 
to some extent rational; if not fully, at 
least in bounded terms. Rationality is in 
this sense the higher order rule of struc-
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tural IR theories. For instance, neoreal-
ism derives agents’ behavior from the 
system in the assumption that all the 
units of the system would act similarly if 
posed is the same situation or under the 
same system’s constraints. Since the as-
sumption of rationality implies that the 
units of the system share equal internal 
rules, equal environmental inputs result 
in equal and static behaviors. As Axel-
rod argues, rational choice and struc-
tural theories assume that behaviors are 
a given, and do “not worry about where 
they come from” (Axelrod, 1997, p. 95).
Conversely, in complex systems 
theory, rationality is not a given, but 
a construct. Rationality is an abstract 
concept that agents use to refer to a 
specific set of rules that they see as fit. 
However, this specific set of rules is 
not objective as in structural theories. 
Instead, it is subjective, or (at best) in-
tersubjective among a defined group of 
agents that are part of the same breed or 
niche. Adaptive agents do not share the 
same set of rules of behavior, nor assign 
fitness to their internal rules equally. 
Indeed, depending on coevolution and 
adaptation, a single rule might have 
very different levels of fitness among 
the population (Harrison, 2006a, p. 9). 
The fitness of rules even changes over 
time within an agent due to learning 
and coevolution. In sum, it is devious 
to talk about rationality, especially in a 
singular form, because there is no such 
a thing as a rational or irrational behav-
ior. What we commonly define as ra-
tional behavior is a consequence of our 
actions and not a premise to them. The 
premise is adaptation: the higher order 
rule of CASs.
Adaptation allows us to go be-
yond behavioral assumptions that flat-
ten the heterogeneity of the internation-
al system and assume states to be acting 
under unifying and static principles. 
Whereas structural theories generalize 
contextual and particular patterns of 
behavior to all the units of the system, 
complex systems theory goes one step 
deeper and generalizes how behavior 
emerges among the actors of the sys-
tem. The difference between the two ap-
proaches is fundamental. In neorealism 
and structural liberalism, maximized 
power/security and utility are assumed 
as general behaviors; in complexity the-
ory, they are just some of the emergent 
behaviors that actors can happen to 
have. Just as for rationality, those behav-
iors are a consequence of actions and 
not a premise to them. They are partially 
incidental, and partially the outcome of 
a selection of fit rules made by agents.
In addition, by using the concept 
of adaptation, agents and systems can be 
theorized dynamic. Behaviors change 
over time in a process where evolution-
ary changes in one agent “induce co-
evolutionary changes” also in the other 
agents (Gros, 2011, p. 206). The system 
itself gains a role that goes beyond the 
one usually assigned to it by structural 
IR theories. Not only it acts as a con-
straint to the agents, as neorealism says, 
but it becomes a generator for new inter-
nal rules of behavior of the agents (Hoff-
mann, 2006, p. 98; Waltz, 1979, p. 109).
Corpus: Information Processing 
and Self-Organization
Adaptive agents generate self-organi-
zation and entropy-defying behavior at 
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the system level (Mitchell, 2009, p. 40). 
Self-organization, as previously men-
tioned, arises from the local interaction 
of agents with limited information and 
computational power and creates stable 
macroscopic patterns at the aggregate 
level (Epstein & Axtell, 1996, p. 35). It 
entails that systems themselves com-
pute information.
Organized behavior occurring with- 
out centralized control is the outcome 
of parallel information processing at 
the individual and aggregate level. 
Agents process information, as previ-
ously explained, by using internal rules 
of behavior. Information for them is 
something static and specifically locat-
ed. It is something that is fed to them 
or that they retrieve something passive 
that they can precisely or statically lo-
cate in a particular place of the system 
(Mitchell, 2009, p. 180): a page on the 
Internet, a book in a library, a law in 
the civil code. Information, however, 
comes in another shape and forms at 
the aggregate and social level.
In biology, information is often re-
ferred as “analog patterns distributed in 
space and time over the system” (Mitch-
ell, n.d.). Instead of being something, 
static and statistically located, infor-
mation takes “the form of statistics and 
dynamics of patterns over the system’s 
components” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 180). 
Because data are encoded “as statistical 
and time-varying patterns of low-lev-
el components,” no single agent “of the 
system can perceive or communicate the 
‘big picture’ of the state of the system” 
(Mitchell, 2009, p. 180). In other words, 
information cannot be retrieved deliber-
ately; therefore, the system has to rely on 
agents sampling data in a stochastic and 
decentralized manner (Mitchell, n.d.).
Accordingly, social organiza-
tions make sense of system dynamics 
via agents working together in a “paral-
lel fashion” and acting with elements of 
randomness (within the boundaries of 
self-regulation) to sample and explore 
information across the whole system 
(Mitchell, 2005, p. 4; Zhong et al., 2005, 
p. 137). Randomness, in turn, is always 
adjusted by coevolutionary dynamics 
and occurs in a back-and-forth of bot-
tom-up and top-down processes that 
channel agents’ behavior. As Mitchell 
writes:
As in all adaptive systems, main-
taining a correct balance between 
these two modes of exploration 
[bottom-up and top-down] is 
essential. Indeed, the optimal 
balance shifts over time. Early 
explorations, based on little or 
no information, are largely ran-
dom, unfocused, and bottom-up. 
As information is obtained and 
acted on, exploration gradual-
ly becomes more deterministic, 
focused, and top-down, in re-
sponse to what has been per-
ceived by the system. (Mitchell, 
2005, p. 5)
Having discussed what plays the 
role of information and how informa-
tion is sampled, the final part of this 
section addresses what is the meaning 
of information and why information 
processing leads to self-organization in 
the international system. The meaning 
of information is important because 
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agents decide their course of actions 
upon it. The meaning is always subjec-
tive and contextual; however, agents 
use shared criteria to assign meaning 
to information. In biological terms, the 
meaning of information is tied to fit-
ness and survival. Information means 
something to an agent based on how 
it affects its fitness (Mitchell, 2009, p. 
184). Henceforth, the appropriate re-
sponse to an input is one that increases 
the overall agent fitness.
Fitness and versatility in rules of 
behaviour are what determine the over-
all fitness of an agent (Holland, 1995, 
p. 63). Since adaptability is an essential 
attribute for agents survival, the success 
of an agent does not derive from its “raw 
power plus cunning,” as social Darwin-
ists and realists believe, but from its 
ability to cope with the complexity of 
the system, to process information and 
discover new fit rules (Clemens, 2006, 
p. 74). Moreover, agents’ fitness are in-
tertwined in a coevolutionary process 
(Clemens, 2006, p. 75). For instance, in 
“an arms race, the peaks of a predator 
and its prey may gain or decline accord-
ing to changes in their offensive and 
defensive capabilities” (Clemens, 2006, 
p. 75). If the attacker gains a new lethal 
attack tactic, his fitness peak will rise, 
and the one of the prey will decrease. 
However, if the prey develops a counter 
tactic, the peak of the attacker will de-
crease. Yet, both will be better off than 
the rest of agents that have not been part 
of the coevolutionary process, which 
did not adapt to the new offensive and 
defensive tactics.
However, the concept of fitness is 
possible to understand the evolutionary 
function of self-organization. Self-orga-
nization emerges from the coevolution 
of rules of behavior among adaptive 
agents as an evolutionary response to 
the complexity of the system. Via or-
ganization, agents are able to process 
information collectively and increase 
their computational power. In addi-
tion, self-organization increases deter-
ministic and focused behaviors among 
agents, with the outcome of increas-
ing the overall efficiency of the system 
(Mitchell, 2005, p. 5). In other words, 
self-organization acts as a magnifier for 
coevolution of fit rules among agents. 
Social organizations, and in par-
ticular the nation-state, are systems 
with strong self-organization and top-
down processes that channel agents 
into increasingly deterministic and fo-
cused behaviors. They have no purpose 
outside of those defined by their com-
ponents. Nevertheless, they do have 
an inherited function, which is one of 
the favoring coevolutions and promot-
ing fit rules among their population. 
For example, nation-states execute this 
function by balancing bottom-up and 
top-down processes with institutions, 
unfocused and focused behavior with 
norms, randomness, and determinism 
with redistribution. 
Conversely, the international 
system has only a “passive” role in fa-
voring coevolution. Whereas states act 
as meta-agents to promote fit behavior, 
the international system is only a place 
where coevolution takes place: a medi-
um for agents to interact and adapt to 
each other. System-wide self-organiza-
tion still subsists, but it is less structured 
and less resilient. Partially it is so be-
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cause the system is composed of many 
different heterogeneous components, 
each embedded in a different niche and 
each with its own environmental and 
social context. In addition, partially it 
is so because information processing 
on a global scale is computationally ex-
pensive. Which means that information 
sampling has to rely even more on ran-
domness and loosely regulated explor-
ative behaviors. In this sense, disorder 
in the international system should not 
be seen in a negative light.10 Far from 
being a source of chaos, self-organized 
anarchy in the international system 
bends disorder to generate entropy-de-
fying behaviors.11
Conclusion
This paper was set to formalize a complex systems theory ap-proach to the study of inter-
national relations. It defined a meth-
odology capable of dealing with the 
nonlinearity of international affairs 
and proposed a new taxonomy for the 
discipline built around core ideas of 
complexity theory. The study has gone 
some way toward enhancing our un-
derstanding of the international system 
by proposing an alternative perspective 
on international affairs that uses the 
10 As Walter Clemens writes, fitness is found in the middle ranges of the spectrum between ultrast-
ability (rigid order) and instability (chaos). With “creative and constructive responses to complex 
challenges [ ... ] more likely to be found close to the edge of chaos than toward the other end of the 
spectrum” (Clemens, 2006, p. 74).
11 Self-organized anarchy differs from anarchy as conceptualized in neorealism. Whereas both im-
ply lack of central control, only the former assume nation-states to be functionally differentiated 
within the system. The role of randomness has largely been misunderstood in positivist IR theory 
and it is one of the reasons why scholars have often been “slipping” between levels. Due to a wide-
spread deterministic-centralized mind-set, there has been a tendency to believe that randomness 
is disruptive of patterns and that stable organized patters arise under the coordination of a central 
controller (Waltz, 1979, p. 97).
concepts of fitness, adaptation, coevo-
lution, self-organization, and informa-
tion processing. 
The first section looked at the 
state of discourse in IR and specified 
why complex systems theory stands out 
as a viable research method for dealing 
with the multi-faced complex reality of 
international politics. As it was pointed 
out, complexity theory could potentially 
integrate different IR school of thoughts 
by using an inside–out view that mix-
es the ontological perspectives of con-
structivism and structural theories. 
Moreover, complex systems theory pro-
vides novel analytical tools that could be 
used to tackle the nonlinearity of social 
systems, which instead is persistently ig-
nored by traditional IR theories.
The second section introduced 
the methodology of complex systems 
theory and agent-based modeling. It de-
fined the properties of a complex adap-
tive system and described the interna-
tional system as composed of many 
diverse, interconnected, and indepen-
dent agents that iterate nonlinear rela-
tionships from which multilevel behav-
ior emerges and evolve. As advocated in 
this section, IR scholars should make 
methodological changes in the way they 
study international affairs. Modeling 
should shift from continuous to dis-
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crete, from linear to nonlinear, from de-
terministic to stochastic, from abstract 
to detailed, and from homogeneous to 
composite (Downey, 2012, p. 4).
The third section introduced a 
new taxonomy rooted in the proposi-
tions of complex systems theory and 
then used it to reframe the internation-
al system. Then it analyzed the granu-
larity of the international system and 
differentiated between agents (people) 
and meta-agents (social organizations), 
explaining that the latter should be 
studied as structures that have emerged 
from the adaptive interactions of the 
former. After having exposed the mul-
tilevel nature of adaptive systems, the 
section criticized the traditional com-
partmentalization of world politics into 
levels of analysis, which prevents schol-
ars to see the relationship between mi-
crospecifications and macrobehavior. 
In the section on the “operators” 
of the international system, it was in-
ferred that adaptation is the higher or-
der rule that drives agents’ behavior. It 
was suggested that, instead of assuming 
a unitary (and maybe rational) behav-
ior for all agents, it would be better to 
assume how behavior is constructed. 
The section then described how adap-
tive behavior comes about through the 
processes of performance system, credit 
assignment, and rule discovery. 
Lastly, the final section looked at 
the outcomes of adaptive interactions 
among agents and evaluated what is the 
function of states and the internation-
al system. The research indicated that, 
in the international system, not only 
agents process information, but also 
the system is actively doing so, with the 
consequence being the establishment of 
self-organization among agents. One of 
the more significant arguments made 
in this study is the one that self-orga-
nization is a property of systems that 
emerges from coevolution of adaptive 
agents as an evolutionary response that 
serves to supply for agents’ limited re-
sources and foresight. 
From this perspective, it was 
then possible to explain that states are 
complex systems with strong levels of 
self-organization and top-down pro-
cesses that increasingly channel agents 
into deterministic and focused behav-
ior. Hence, the function of states was 
suggested to be the one of the favoring 
coevolutions and promoting fit rules 
among their population. Conversely, it 
was noticed that the international sys-
tem remains only mildly self-organized. 
With a possible explanation for this 
characteristic being that disorganized 
behavior is, to an extent, necessary for 
the system to process global informa-
tion, which takes the form of distribut-
ed patterns over the system.
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